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LEARNING HORIZON AND OPTIMAL ALLIANCE FORMATION 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We develop a theoretical Bayesian learning model to examine how a firm’s learning horizon, 
defined as the maximum distance in a network of alliances across which the firm learns from 
other firms, conditions its optimal number of direct alliance partners under technological 
uncertainty. We compare theoretical optima for a ‘close’ learning horizon, where a firm learns 
only from direct alliance partners, and a ‘distant’ learning horizon, where a firm learns both from 
direct and indirect alliance partners. Our theory implies that in high tech industries, a distant 
learning horizon allows a firm to substitute indirect for direct partners, while in low tech 
industries indirect partners complement direct partners. Moreover, in high tech industries, 
optimal alliance formation is less sensitive to changes in structural model parameters when a 
firm’s learning horizon is distant rather than close. Our contribution lies in offering a formal 
theory of the role of indirect partners in optimal alliance portfolio design that generates normative 
propositions amenable to future empirical refutation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have long noted that technological uncertainty, defined as the difficulty of 
accurately predicting the future state of the technological environment, motivates firms to enter 
into alliances with other firms (Auster 1992; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Hagedoorn 2002; 
Mody 1993; Rosenkopf and Schilling 2007; Steensma et al. 2000). Alliances are an important 
mechanism for reducing technological uncertainty because they allow firms to learn from their 
alliance partners about relevant developments in the technological environment (Frankort et al. 
2012; Frankort 2013; Gomes-Casseres et al. 2006; Mowery et al. 1996; Oxley and Wada 2009; 
Powell et al. 1996). However, alliances are not equally effective as an uncertainty-reduction 
mechanism in all circumstances, while they also induce costs. Therefore, the optimal number of 
alliances represents a balance between the uncertainty-reduction benefits and costs of alliances, 
so that a firm has enough alliances to reduce uncertainty effectively, but not so many as for costs 
to outweigh their benefits (Faems et al. 2012). Convergent with the existence of such a balance, 
empirical evidence shows that learning-related outcomes tend to be greatest at intermediate 
alliance portfolio size (Deeds and Hill 1996; Frankort et al. 2012; Lahiri & Narayanan 2013; 
Rothaermel and Deeds 2006; Vanhaverbeke et al. 2012, 2014). 
Nevertheless, even though empirical evidence on optimal alliance portfolio size resonates 
with a basic trade-off between the uncertainty-reduction benefits and costs of alliances, the 
underlying theory has overwhelmingly centered on firms’ direct partners as sources of learning 
and uncertainty reduction. This somewhat narrow focus on direct partners appears at odds with 
findings suggesting that alliances may also serve as conduits through which firms learn from their 
indirect partners, i.e., the set of firms that direct partners have access to through their own 
alliances (Ahuja 2000; Salman and Saives 2005; Soh and Roberts 2005; Vanhaverbeke et al. 
2012). To the extent firms have the potential to learn not just from direct but also indirect 
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partners, a fundamental question arises as to how learning from indirect partners affects the trade-
off between the uncertainty-reduction benefits and costs of alliances. Answering this question is 
important because it is doubtful that the learning potential afforded by indirect partners is 
straightforwardly proportional to that afforded by direct partners. For example, firms vary greatly 
in their number of indirect partners for a given number of direct partners (e.g., Iyer et al. 2006)1, 
while they may also differ in the extent to which they are aware of (e.g., Lhuillery and Pfister 
2011) and benefit from (e.g., Boyd and Spekman 2008; Ghosh and Rosenkopf 2014) such 
indirect partners. Motivated by these observations, and following a call to begin to consider the 
role of indirect partners in optimal alliance portfolio design (Lavie 2006: 651), we complement 
the study of optimal alliance formation under technological uncertainty with a systematic theory 
of how learning from indirect partners shapes a firm’s optimal alliance portfolio size. Our 
specific research question is this: In the face of technological uncertainty, how does learning 
from indirect partners influence a firm’s optimal number of direct partners? 
We take a formal approach to answering this question. In particular, we derive normative 
propositions regarding optimal alliance formation from a theoretical Bayesian learning model of 
how firms facing technological uncertainty form alliances and then use those alliances to learn 
and thereby reduce such uncertainty. In addition to being considered a leading formal device for 
modeling decision making under uncertainty (Cyert and DeGroot 1987), a Bayesian learning 
framework is particularly well suited to address our specific research question. First, the Bayesian 
approach accords central importance to the initial uncertainty surrounding key parameters, while 
                                                          
    1 For example, in the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry during 1990-94, The Upjohn Company and Sepracor 
Inc. both had two direct partners, though these connected Upjohn to only two indirect partners while connecting 
Sepracor to well over twenty (Roijakkers and Hagedoorn 2006, p. 439). As another example, in the global 
semiconductor manufacturing industry during 1990-96, both Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd. and Motorola 
Inc. had one direct partner, but Matsushita had two indirect partners while Motorola had six (Kapoor and McGrath 
2014, p. 564). These examples foreshadow that the learning potential afforded by firms’ respective sets of direct and 
indirect partners may vary independently. It follows that the theory of optimal alliance formation must explicitly 
account for heterogeneity in the extent to which distinct sets of indirect partners allow for learning and uncertainty 
reduction. 
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Bayesian updating subsequently allows actors to reduce such uncertainty through a mechanism of 
learning. This particular temporal sequence, in which actors respond to uncertainty by looking for 
learning opportunities that in turn help improve their beliefs about the uncertain parameter of 
interest, sits at the heart of the empirical phenomenon we are interested in modeling. 
Second, a Bayesian learning framework allows us to model the effects of multiple 
parameters relevant to our research question in a tractable way. This is important because factors 
such as perceived technological uncertainty, the cost of unresolved uncertainty, the viability of 
interfirm learning, the cost of alliances, and awareness of indirect partners can vary greatly across 
firms and industries (e.g., Hagedoorn 2002; Harrigan 1985; Rosenkopf and Schilling 2007; 
Sutcliffe and Huber 1998), while all may individually as well as jointly shape the consequences 
of learning from indirect partners in perhaps unanticipated ways. A formal Bayesian learning 
framework, by requiring clear mathematical definitions of all relevant parameters and due to the 
rigor imposed by the Bayesian updating mechanism, allows us to generate an integrative and 
logically consistent account of any such effects (Adner et al. 2009). 
In our Bayesian learning model, a firm begins with subjective beliefs about key features 
and trends characterizing an uncertain technological environment. The firm can update its beliefs 
by forming one or more alliances with other firms. The learning potential of the resulting set of 
alliances, and so the extent to which a firm can reduce technological uncertainty, is modeled as a 
function of the firm’s learning horizon. We define a firm’s learning horizon as the maximum 
distance in a firm’s network of alliances across which that firm learns from other firms. We 
develop two canonical scenarios. In the first scenario, the firm learns only from its direct partners 
and so we label its learning horizon as ‘close’. In the second, the firm learns both from its direct 
and indirect partners and so we label its learning horizon as ‘distant’ instead. In our model, more 
precisely, a firm has a distant learning horizon if it is both aware of one or more indirect partners 
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and able to learn from such partners. A comparison of the optimal alliance formation decisions in 
these distinct scenarios subsequently supplies precise normative propositions on how learning 
from indirect partners influences optimal alliance formation under technological uncertainty. 
Our formal assessment of the relationship between firms’ learning horizon and optimal 
alliance formation under technological uncertainty offers several key results. First, we show that 
a firm’s learning horizon has distinct implications for optimal alliance formation depending on its 
industry context (e.g., Ahuja 2000, pp. 450-451). Specifically, in industries where technological 
uncertainty is comparatively high, residual uncertainty is costly, and where alliances are a 
comparatively affordable and effective solution to technological uncertainty (which we label 
‘high tech industries’), firms with a distant learning horizon can substitute alliance ties to indirect 
partners for those with direct partners. In contrast, in industries where technological uncertainty is 
comparatively low, residual uncertainty is less costly, and where alliances are a comparatively 
costly and ineffective solution to technological uncertainty (which we label ‘low tech industries’), 
alliance ties to direct and indirect partners act as complements. 
Second, we show that given a distant learning horizon, the optimal number of direct 
partners of a firm in a high tech industry will be more robust to inter-temporal changes in the cost 
of residual technological uncertainty, the cost of alliances, and the perceived level of 
technological uncertainty. Through a Bayesian lens, therefore, the inter-temporal stability of a 
firm’s alliance activities may be understood as the strategically optimal outcome of its efforts to 
reduce technological uncertainty. This novel insight complements prior alliance research, which 
has often discussed inter-temporal stability in firms’ alliance activities through embeddedness 
and inertia mechanisms (e.g., Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Hagedoorn 2006; Kim et al. 2006). 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic setting and payoff 
structure in our model. Sections 3 and 4 develop expressions for optimal alliance formation under 
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close and distant learning horizons, respectively. Section 5 compares the respective optimal 
decisions in equilibrium and derives our basic propositions. Section 6 generalizes the model to 
account for heterogeneous alliance formation and incomplete awareness of indirect partners. 
Section 7 discusses the findings and their implications. 
2. THE BASIC MODEL 
2.1 Setting 
We consider a setting in which a firm performs research and development (R&D) 
activities within an industry-level technological paradigm. A technological paradigm directs the 
search efforts of firms towards an optimal future technology along a technological trajectory 
(Breschi et al. 2000; Dosi 1982). A technological trajectory represents “…the activity of 
technological process along the economic and technological trade-offs defined by a paradigm…” 
(Dosi 1988, p. 1128). However, even though a technological paradigm produces some notion of 
what paths of research to pursue and avoid, the superiority of one direction over another is likely 
unclear a priori (Nelson and Winter 1982) and so a firm’s expectations regarding an ‘optimal’ 
technological trajectory are inevitably imprecise. 
We represent the optimal technological trajectory by a parameter T. We assume that a 
technological paradigm has one optimal technological trajectory T. An optimal trajectory is not 
necessarily the one that is closest to the technological frontier or technologically superior 
(Anderson and Tushman 1990; Arthur 1989; Liebowitz and Margolis 1995). Rather, it is the one 
that among conceivable alternatives appears most promising “on the ground of some rather 
obvious and broad criteria such as feasibility, marketability and profitability” (Dosi 1982, p. 155). 
Our assumption of one optimal trajectory is consistent with a flurry of industry cases 
documenting the eventual emergence of one comparatively dominant technology across settings 
as diverse as cement, glass, and minicomputers (Anderson and Tushman 1990), automobiles, 
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electronic calculators, picture tubes, television, transistors, and typewriters (Suarez and Utterback 
1995), as well as video tapes (Cusumano et al. 1992). Moreover, note that our assumption of one 
optimal technological trajectory does not preclude the contemporaneous existence of additional 
trajectories with some merit; all it requires is that at any one moment in time, prevailing 
technological, economic, and institutional constraints point to one technological trajectory that is 
on aggregate projected to be more feasible, marketable, and profitable. 
Because the optimal technological trajectory depends on trade-offs along several 
technological, economic, and institutional dimensions and given that such trade-offs reflect a 
complex interplay between different actors (Dosi 1982; Garud et al. 1997), we assume that T is 
exogenous to the R&D activities of any one individual firm. If a firm had full information, it 
would make R&D investments consistent with the technological trajectory as given by T. In what 
follows, we refer to T as the optimal technology. We assume that each firm has incomplete 
knowledge about T, yet even though T is uncertain, a firm nevertheless has initial expectations 
about T based on available information (e.g., that accumulated through prior experience). We 
represent such initial expectations about the value of T by a prior probability distribution that is 
normal with mean μ and variance 
2
T , such that T ~ N(μ,
2
T ). This prior probability distribution 
expresses a firm’s initial perceived technological uncertainty. 
2.2 Payoffs 
The technology ultimately implemented by a firm is represented by the decision 
parameter d. For a decision d, a firm’s cost function is given by C(T, d) = b’|T – d|, where b’ 
represents the cost a firm incurs when implementing a technology d that deviates from the 
optimal technology T by one unit and so b’> 0. This definition of b’ allows for the possibility that 
a given deviation from T is not equally costly in all settings. For example, it is conceivable that in 
industries where technological progress is comparatively more important, b’—i.e., the marginal 
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cost of getting d wrong given T—is higher than in industries where technological progress is less 
important. Because of imperfect substitutability of R&D outcomes across different trajectories 
and due to strong path dependencies within them (Dosi 1982; Nelson and Winter 1982; Sahal 
1981), in practical terms one might view C(T, d) as capturing the opportunity cost of suboptimal 
R&D investment as well as the capital, effort, and time associated with adjusting to, and catching 
up with progress in, the optimal technological trajectory. The cost function shows that a firm 
incurs higher costs when the distance between d and T increases and so absent technological 
uncertainty, a firm would select d = T. However, complete certainty is improbable and so a firm 
will at best be able to reduce rather than eliminate uncertainty so as to pinpoint T with greater 
precision. Because knowledge about T is dispersed across firms within the industry, it is useful 
for firms to search for information to decrease technological uncertainty. 
In our model, a firm can gather information about the properties of T by forming one or 
more alliances with other firms and we represent the number of alliances formed by a firm by  . 
We assume that each alliance yields one direct observation—i.e., one set of information about the 
optimal technology T. A firm begins with an initial belief represented by the prior probability 
distribution concerning T. Using the observations obtained from its alliances, the firm updates its 
prior probability distribution and forms a posterior belief—i.e., a posterior probability 
distribution concerning T—that incorporates the observations obtained through its alliances. This 
transformation or ‘updating’ of the prior belief concerning T into a posterior belief about that 
parameter is what makes our model Bayesian. In particular, the posterior distribution of the 
optimal technology T is obtained by deriving the distribution of T conditional on the prior belief 
of the firm and on the observations obtained from its alliances. Based on this posterior belief 
about T, a firm chooses d = dopt that minimizes the expected value of C(T, d). Thus, dopt is 
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determined through ),(min
,
dTCE
Td 
, where E represents the expectations operator with respect to 
T and the   below E denotes that a firm chooses d based on the posterior probability distribution 
of T after obtaining observations through its   alliances. 
The observations a firm obtains through its alliances are jointly normally distributed with 
mean T and a covariance structure as will be given in Section 3, and the posterior probability 
distribution of T is normal with mean μη and variance 
2
 . The expression ||
,
dTE
T


 is 
minimized when d equals the median of the probability distribution of T. As T follows a normal 
distribution, the median and mean are equal and so ||||||min
,,,
YETEdTE
TTTd 


  , where 
Y follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance equal to 2 . The expected value of 
the absolute value of Y is equal to 



2
,
2
|| YE
T
 (DeGroot 1970, pp. 232-233) and so it follows 
that 
(1) 





 bbdTCE
Td
2
'
,
2
),(min , 
where   is the standard deviation of a firm’s posterior belief about T, reflecting a firm’s 
residual technological uncertainty after it obtains sets of information through its alliances, and the 
parameter b collects all constant terms. Note that while   plays a role in equation (1), μη does 
not. Additionally, while a firm may reduce its technological uncertainty through its   alliances 
with other firms, each individual alliance involves a cost c that captures the capital, effort, and 
time necessary to form, operate, and terminate that alliance. For tractability, we begin by 
interpreting the cost c as a parameter that is stable both across alliances as well as across firms. 
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However, this stability assumption can be relaxed without loss of generality and we take 
advantage of this possibility in Section 6, when generalizing our equilibrium results. 
Consequently, the optimal number of alliances minimizes the total cost TC: 
(2)  minTC b c

     . 
Thus, a firm’s total cost is an increasing function of the posterior standard deviation   and so a 
firm has an incentive to minimize residual technological uncertainty (Hagedoorn et al. 2011; 
Letterie et al. 2007). As we will show later, because an increase in the number of alliances 
decreases  , the optimal number of alliances represents a resolution of the trade-off between 
the uncertainty-reduction benefits of alliances on the one hand, and their costs (i.e., c ) on the 
other hand. 
3. OPTIMAL ALLIANCE FORMATION FOR A CLOSE LEARNING HORIZON 
Consider the case where a firm’s learning horizon is close and so it only learns through 
alliances with its own partners, but not through the alliances of its partners. The observation a 
firm receives through one alliance, which we represent by xi, is normally distributed with mean T 
and variance 2x . We assume that individual observations are independent, such that an 
observation ix  captures the non-redundant part of the information set obtained through one 
alliance. Thus, we assume that each alliance will yield at least some unique information as 
compared both with the firm’s own knowledge and that accessed through its other alliances. This 
assumption is conceivable because individual firms tend not to have fully identical knowledge 
bases. It is also consistent with findings in empirical research showing that firms consider 
knowledge complementarity when selecting their alliance partners (Arora and Gambardella 1990; 
Mowery et al. 1998; Rothaermel and Boeker 2008). Note that this independence assumption is 
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plausible, as each of a firm’s partners must only hold some knowledge that is not held by the 
firm’s other partners. Therefore, the independence assumption fully accommodates the possibility 
that the beliefs a firm’s partners hold about the optimal technology T are partly redundant, for 
example in case such partners also have alliances with one another (Ahuja 2000). By implication, 
the observations x1, x2, ... , xη that a firm obtains through its   alliances are jointly normally 
distributed with mean T and a covariance structure as given by a diagonal matrix Σx. 
Each observation xi provides a set of information about T but this information set will be 
imprecise to a greater or lesser extent (i.e., 02 x ). First, due to the “permanent existence of 
asymmetries among firms, in terms of their…technologies” (Dosi 1988, p. 1155), information is 
scattered across industry firms and so no individual firm has full information about T. Second, to 
the extent that knowledge is tacit and embedded in routines and interactions within firms, its 
transmission across firm boundaries may be challenging (Kogut and Zander 1992). Third, to 
appropriate the returns to their knowledge, firms have a strategic reason to protect part of their 
knowledge about T from leakage to their alliance partners (Oxley and Wada 2009). While such 
strategizing may lead firms to be protective of their in-house knowledge, we assume that firms 
will not purposely mislead their alliance partners and so strategic motives may affect the variance 
of an observation but not the mean. 
Consequently, after a firm has acquired observations x1, x2, ... , xη through its  alliances, 
it will face a residual level of technological uncertainty as given by the posterior variance of T: 
(3) 
1
22
2 1










Tx 

 . 
Derivation of this posterior variance is given in the Appendix. Equation (3) clearly shows that the 
Bayesian learning mechanism generates a posterior variance of T that is conditional on both the 
prior belief of the firm regarding T as well as the observations it obtains from its alliances. 
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Substituting equation (3) into (2) and solving for the optimal number of alliances 
*  yields 
(4)  
2
2
3
1
2*
T
x
xa


  , 
where
3
2
2







c
b
a , to save some notation. The optimal number of alliances is a continuous 
variable here but in practice a firm will choose an integer value close to 
*  yielding the lowest 
cost as implied by equation (2). Also, note that in our model, because firms choose the optimal 
(in the Bayesian sense) number of alliances 
* , in equilibrium no firm will have an incentive to 
deviate from this optimum. 
Equation (4) provides a number of results. The optimal number of alliances increases with 
the cost of uncertainty b, while it decreases with the cost of alliances c. Moreover, the optimal 
number of alliances increases with a firm’s perceived level of technological uncertainty 
2
T . 
Consequently, initial technological uncertainty represents an inducement for firms to enter into 
alliances that will in turn increase firms’ information about T, thus reducing their residual 
technological uncertainty 
2
 . Descriptive findings are consistent with this result. In dynamic 
industry settings with high technological uncertainty, such as information technology or 
pharmaceutical biotechnology, firms tend to engage in more alliances than in more stable 
industry settings, such as food and beverages (Hagedoorn 2002). Equation (4) thus formally 
captures the widely-established notion that technological uncertainty constitutes an important 
motivation for firms to enter into alliances with other firms (Auster 1992; Hagedoorn 2002; 
Mody 1993; Rosenkopf and Schilling 2007). 
Finally, to see how the optimal number of alliances depends on the variance of an 
observation 2x , we obtain the first order derivative of 
* with respect to 2x  as follows: 
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(5)       3
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
*
3
1
3












x
T
x
T
x
x
aa







. 
This derivative varies with the cost b of residual (i.e., posterior) technological uncertainty   
relative to the cost of alliances c, and the level of uncertainty 
2
T  relative to the variance of an 
observation 2x . Therefore, interpretation of the role of 
2
x  in shaping 
*  is conditional on two 
distinct industry scenarios that we define as follows2: 
 
A high tech industry is one in which (1) the cost b of residual technological uncertainty 
  is high relative to the cost of alliances c, and (2) the initial technological uncertainty 
2
T  is high relative to the variance of an observation 
2
x . 
 
A low tech industry is one in which (1) the cost b of residual technological uncertainty   
is low relative to the cost of alliances c, and (2) the initial technological uncertainty 
2
T  is 
low relative to the variance of an observation 2x . 
 
In a high tech industry, the first order derivative in equation (5) is positive and so a firm 
will form more alliances when the variance of observations becomes greater. As the incentive to 
learn through alliances in this setting is strong (loosely, b > c and 
2
T  > 
2
x ), greater variance of 
observations induces a firm to establish more alliances. For a low tech industry, the first order 
derivative in equation (5) is negative and so a firm will form fewer alliances when the variance of 
observations increases. In this setting, the incentive to learn through alliances is weak (loosely, b 
                                                          
    2 Our labeling of these two scenarios as ‘high tech industry’ and ‘low tech industry’ reflects the close consistency 
between empirically observed high tech and low tech industries and our theoretical definitions of both. For example, 
compared to low tech industries, the R&D intensities of high tech industries are much higher (Dyer et al. 2014), 
while the marginal impact of firms’ technology stocks on their value added and market valuations is also higher in 
high tech industries, such as pharmaceutical biotechnology (e.g., Cuneo and Mairesse 1984; Hall et al. 2005). This 
suggests that the level of technological uncertainty as well as the cost of residual technological uncertainty is much 
higher in high tech compared to low tech industries, thus outweighing the costs and learning imperfections of 
alliances, as reflected in high tech firms’ greater propensity to engage in alliances with other firms (Hagedoorn 2002). 
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< c and 
2
T  < 
2
x ) and so greater variance of observations reduces a firm’s inducement to 
establish more alliances. Therefore, in high tech industries, where technological uncertainty is 
severe and expensive, and where alliances are a comparatively affordable and effective solution 
to such uncertainty, a firm will form more alliances when the variance of observations increases. 
Conversely, in low tech industries, where technological uncertainty is limited and less expensive, 
and where alliances are a comparatively expensive and ineffective solution to such uncertainty, a 
firm will form fewer alliances when the variance of observations increases. 
4. OPTIMAL ALLIANCE FORMATION FOR A DISTANT LEARNING HORIZON 
Now consider the case where a firm’s learning horizon is distant and so it learns both 
through alliances with its own partners as well as through indirect partners, defined as the set of 
firms that direct partners have access to through their own alliances. Let each alliance partner 
have ω alliance partners itself. Because the focal firm is included in ω, we must subtract one 
from ω to obtain the number of indirect partners provided by a direct partner. Therefore, each of 
a firm’s direct partners yields ω – 1 indirect partners and so   direct alliances yield  1   
indirect observations. We assume that individual observations obtained through indirect partners, 
represented here by xj, are independent and so each indirect partner will yield at least some 
unique information compared to the firm’s own knowledge base, the knowledge bases of its 
direct alliance partners, and the knowledge bases of its other indirect partners. 
For the reasons as outlined in the previous Section, the set of information about the 
optimal technology T captured through an observation xj will be imprecise. Because an increase 
in distance between firms makes the movement of knowledge more challenging (Burt 2010), we 
assume that a firm’s indirect partners yield more variable observations about T than its direct 
partners. Specifically, in our model a firm observes jjj xy  , where the stochastic term j  is 
16 
 
normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2 , the latter which represents the additional 
transmission noise surrounding an indirect observation compared to an observation drawn from a 
direct partner. While an indirect observation also has a mean T, its variance is 22  x  and so 
the uncertainty-reduction potential of one indirect observation is smaller than that of one direct 
observation because 222 xx    . 
With a distant learning horizon, after acquiring   direct and  1   indirect 
observations, a firm faces a residual level of technological uncertainty as given by the posterior 
variance of T: 
(6) 
   
 
1
222
22
2
1
2222
2 111
























Tx
x
xTxx 











 . 
Note that the expression in equation (6) bears analogy to equation (3), except that it additionally 
accounts for the uncertainty-reduction potential of  1   indirect partners. In equation (3), 
which gives the posterior variance of T for a close learning horizon, each observation obtained 
from one direct partner has a variance equal to 
2
1
2
1
x
x











. In equation (6), which instead gives 
the posterior variance of T for a distant learning horizon, each observation obtained from one 
direct partner has a variance that is in the aggregate equal to 
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
. Consequently, though indirect observations 
themselves have greater transmission noise than direct observations, the overall variance of the 
combined information sets obtained through one of a firm’s direct partners is smaller for a distant 
compared to a close learning horizon. Substituting equation (6) into (2) and solving for the 
optimal number of alliances 
**  yields 
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Here, too, observe the analogy to equation (4) for a close learning horizon. Assuming for the 
moment that all firms are identical in their alliance formation strategies, we can impose the 
symmetry condition    to obtain a Nash equilibrium as follows: 
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In our theoretical model this is a likely outcome because to this point, we have assumed that the 
payoffs and costs of alliance formation are symmetric. After we compare equilibria for close and 
distant learning horizons, we relax this symmetry condition in Section 6 in order to generalize our 
equilibrium results. A solution for equation (8) is not tractable but the expression nevertheless 
has properties directly relevant to our decision problem. For instance, an increase in the 
transmission noise 2  generates: 
(9) 
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Thus, for a distant learning horizon, if the variability of observations drawn from indirect partners 
increases, then a firm’s uncertainty reduction progressively becomes a function of localized 
learning from direct partners alone. In that case, 
**  asymptotically converges to * . The 
transmission noise 2  captures the inverse of a firm’s ability to learn from indirect partners and 
so the intuition of equation (9) is that despite the presence of indirect partners, a firm nevertheless 
has a close learning horizon if it is unable to learn from indirect partners. 
Next, to see how the optimal number of alliances given a distant learning horizon varies 
with the main parameters of the model, we restrict our attention to a high tech industry because in 
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a low tech industry, equilibrium outcomes for several partial derivatives are indefinite. First note 
that in a high tech industry    
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a  and so the optimal number of alliances increases with the cost of residual 
technological uncertainty b, while it decreases with the cost of alliances c, as in the case of a 
close learning horizon (see equation (4)). Also, the first order derivative of 
**  with respect to a 
firm’s perceived level of technological uncertainty 
2
T  is 
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Therefore, a firm’s optimal number of direct partners increases if the firm perceives greater 
technological uncertainty. Next, 
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and so if the additional transmission noise surrounding an observation from an indirect partner 
becomes greater, then the number of direct partners increases to compensate for such additional 
variance. Similarly, note that 
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(13) 
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and so the number of direct partners increases when the variability of observations obtained 
through a firm’s direct partners increases. 
5. COMPARING EQUILIBRIA 
Having developed the Bayesian analysis for both close and distant learning horizons, we 
now turn to a comparison of 
*  and ** , the respective optimal decisions for the two scenarios. 
We begin with two key insights from the prior Sections. First, equilibrium outcomes respond 
differently to increases in information variability depending on the context because 0
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
 in a 
high tech industry whereas 0
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 in a low tech industry. Second, for a distant learning 
horizon each observation through a direct partner has a variance that is, in the aggregate, equal to 
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  and so the overall variability of information a firm obtains 
through its alliances is smaller for a distant rather than a close learning horizon. 
A change from a close to a distant learning horizon can be viewed as an aggregate 
decrease in information variability. By Sections 3 and 4, this has opposing implications in high 
versus low tech industries. Specifically, in a high tech industry 0
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 and so a firm will form 
fewer alliances if the variability of observations decreases. By this result, and because 
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generates a smaller optimum for a distant compared to a close learning horizon, i.e., 
* > ** . 
This generates the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. In a high tech industry, a firm’s optimal number of alliances is smaller 
when it has a distant rather than a close learning horizon. 
 
Thus, in a high tech industry, a firm with a distant learning horizon can substitute alliance ties to 
indirect partners for those with direct partners. Conversely, if the learning horizon is close—i.e., a 
firm has no indirect partners or it does have, but cannot learn from, such partners—then a firm’s 
optimal number of alliances becomes greater. 
In a low tech industry 0
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variability of observations decreases. By this result, and because     
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a static comparison of 
*  and **  (equations (4) and (8)) generates a larger optimum for a 
distant compared to a close learning horizon, i.e., 
* < ** . This generates the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 2. In a low tech industry, a firm’s optimal number of alliances is greater 
when it has a distant rather than a close learning horizon. 
 
Thus, in a low tech industry, a distant learning horizon instead generates complementarity 
between a firm’s alliance ties to direct and indirect partners: a firm that learns both from direct 
and indirect partners will benefit more from a larger number of direct partners. 
One key insight following directly from our analysis is that though a firm’s learning 
horizon does have an impact on optimal alliance formation, the nature of this association depends 
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on characteristics of the industry context within which the firm is embedded (here, whether the 
industry is low tech or high tech). Together, propositions 1 and 2 reinforce Ahuja’s (2000, pp. 
450-451) suggestion that the nature of the interaction between ties to direct and indirect partners 
“… can only be understood relative to a particular context…” 
Though propositions 1 and 2 represent static implications of the Bayesian learning model, 
the analysis also has dynamic implications for firms in a high tech industry. Suppose a firm 
optimizes its number of alliances every period as a consequence of period-by-period changes in 
the structural parameters of the model. Then, its optimal decision and so its optimal number of 
alliances may vary by period. Indeed, the sensitivity of a firm’s optimal number of alliances to 
changes in structural model parameters may differ between close and distant learning horizons. 
To examine such a dynamic effect, we focus our attention on b, c, and 
2
T  because 
dynamic implications of changes in the variance of an observation 2x  are indefinite. We first 
obtain the partial derivatives of 
*  with respect to the structural parameters a (capturing b and c) 
and 
2
T  and then use the properties of  f  to compare these partial derivatives to equations (10) 
and (11), respectively. For a close learning horizon, the relevant partial derivatives of 
*  are 
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numerator in the respective partial derivates of 
**  (equations (10) and (11)), is smaller than 
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 in a high tech industry. Therefore, a 
comparison of the relevant first order derivatives of 
*  and **  with respect to b, c, and 2T
generates the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3. In a high tech industry, the optimal number of alliances is less sensitive to 
changes in the structural parameters b, c, and 
2
T  when a firm has a distant rather than 
a close learning horizon (i.e., 
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The ordering of the first-order derivatives in proposition 3 implies that a firm’s optimal number 
of direct partners is expected to be more stable—i.e., less sensitive to changes in b, c, and 
2
T —
if the firm learns both from direct and indirect partners. To see why this happens, note that our 
Bayesian model and the resulting Nash equilibrium explicitly account for firms considering the 
alliance formation behavior of their direct partners. Indeed, even though parameters b, c, and 2T  
are assumed exogenous to individual firms, in the case of a distant learning horizon, a focal firm 
calibrates optimal alliance formation in part based on its expectations concerning partners’ 
alliance formation. Because in that case, a firm can benefit from learning from indirect partners, 
it will determine optimal alliance formation keeping in mind such indirect learning benefits. 
These indirect benefits are absent in the case of a close learning horizon, which in turn gives rise 
to the contrast between close and distant learning horizons as summarized in proposition 3. 
For example, let us assume that perceived technological uncertainty 
2
T  increases, which 
represents an exogenous shock that might be due to, for example, the discovery of an additional 
trajectory within a technological paradigm. By equations (3) and (6), the effect of such a shock 
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would be to increase the posterior variance of T—i.e., the residual technological uncertainty 
faced by the firm. Equations (4) and (8) indicate that such an increase in 
2
T  is a motivation for 
the firm to increase its number of alliances, both for close and distant learning horizons. Crucially 
though, the partners of the firm will be similarly motivated and so in case of a distant learning 
horizon, the firm’s increased learning requirement will be satisfied in part by its partners’ alliance 
formation. In our model, the optimal number of alliances in the resulting equilibrium explicitly 
takes into account the alliance formation patterns of partners. Compared to a close learning 
horizon, this is the mechanism reducing variance in the focal firm’s optimal number of alliances 
under a distant learning horizon. A similar line of reasoning holds for the effects of parameters b 
and c. Compared to a close learning horizon, a firm’s distant learning horizon in a high tech 
industry therefore acts as a buffer from changes in several structural model parameters because in 
equilibrium the firm accounts for partners’ responses to such changes. 
6. GENERALIZING THE MODEL 
6.1 Heterogeneous Alliance Formation 
Thus far, we have assumed that    in order to obtain a symmetric Nash equilibrium, 
while we also treated a focal firm as having access to 1  indirect partners. First, even if   , 
the latter assumption is restrictive because some of partners’ direct partners may be ‘redundant’ 
from the perspective of a focal firm, in that they might themselves be direct partners of the firm 
as well (Ahuja 2000; Walker et al. 1997). Moreover, multiple direct partners might have alliances 
with one and the same indirect partner. In both scenarios, a focal firm’s number of non-redundant, 
unique indirect partners will be smaller than 1 . Second, the assumption that    is itself 
restrictive because firms tend to differ in their number of alliance partners (e.g., Roijakkers and 
Hagedoorn 2006; Kapoor and McGrath 2014; Powell et al. 1996). Such heterogeneity may be, for 
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example, due to differences in the costs firms incur to form, operate, and terminate an alliance. 
Indeed, though to this point we have interpreted the cost c as a parameter that is stable both 
across alliances as well as across firms, this stability assumption can be relaxed without loss of 
generality.3 In this Section, we generalize our model to allow explicitly for heterogeneous 
alliance formation. 
Let 1   be the average number of indirect partners that are ‘non-redundant’ from the 
perspective of a focal firm. Then, by equation (7) a firm’s optimal number of alliances is given by 
(14)  
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 . In this setting, propositions 1 and 2 will hold if   2xf   , which 
requires that the number of unique indirect partners is positive, i.e. 1 0   . This condition will 
be satisfied if it is possible for the direct partners of a firm to give access to at least strictly more 
than an average of zero non-redundant, unique indirect partners. The opportunity for non-
redundancy appears to be a weak requirement, first, given the hundreds and often thousands of 
firms populating many industries (e.g., United States Census Bureau 2012). Second, empirical 
research shows that non-redundancy is prevalent even in networks with high degrees of local 
redundancy, due to the propensity of some firms to form ‘bridging’ ties across otherwise 
disconnected parts of an alliance network (e.g., Powell et al. 2005; Rosenkopf and Padula 2008; 
Schilling and Phelps 2007; Sytch et al. 2011). In this more general model, then, not all direct 
partners of the firm are required to have unique partners themselves: even if only one of a firm’s 
direct partners has one unique partner itself, a distant learning horizon can exist and so the 
necessary conditions for propositions 1 and 2 are replicated. Therefore, by relaxing the symmetry 
                                                          
    3 Specifically, this more general assumption amounts to interpreting c as the expected cost of forming, operating, 
and terminating an alliance. 
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condition through allowing   , we impose much weaker sufficiency conditions on 
propositions 1 and 2. 
 This generalization of our model to account for heterogeneous alliance formation allows 
for a descriptive comparison between key implications of propositions 1 and 2 and performance 
in empirically-observed alliance portfolios. One key implication of proposition 1 is that in a high 
tech industry the number of direct alliance partners optimal for technological learning is smaller 
for firms with a more extensive learning horizon. This implication is fully consistent with results 
in Ahuja (2000) and Vanhaverbeke et al. (2012), suggesting that the number of direct alliance 
partners optimal for learning in a number of technology-intensive industries during 1981-1996 
was smaller for firms with greater numbers of indirect partners. One key implication of 
proposition 2 is that in a low tech industry the optimal number of direct alliance partners is 
instead greater for firms with a more extensive learning horizon. Consistent with this implication, 
Koka and Prescott (2008) show that in the low tech steel industry during 1980-94, firms that 
simultaneously had greater numbers of direct as well as indirect partners outperformed others, 
and this effect was even more pronounced during periods of environmental stability. 
 We now turn to generalizing proposition 3. Given that   3
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features of proposition 3 are replicated. In practice, this requires that both a firm and its average 
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partner increase their number of alliances in response to an increase in the parameter 
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reflecting an increase in the cost of residual technological uncertainty b relative to the cost of 
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Under these two fairly general assumptions, the key properties of proposition 3 are 
replicated, generating the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4. In a high tech industry, if alliance formation is heterogeneous (i.e.,   ) 
and firms are homogeneous in the sign of their sensitivity (i.e., both 0 
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), then the optimal number of alliances is 
less sensitive to changes in the structural parameters b, c, and 
2
T  when a firm has a 
distant rather than a close learning horizon (i.e., 
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 ). 
 
Therefore, once we allow for heterogeneous alliance formation, which only introduces weak 
additional constraints, the influence of a firm’s learning horizon on the sensitivity of the firm’s 
optimal number of alliances to changes in structural model parameters is identical in proposition 
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4 compared to proposition 3. One key implication of proposition 4 is that relative to a firm with a 
more restricted learning horizon, a firm with a more extensive learning horizon benefits more 
from a given level of inter-temporal stability in its number of direct alliance partners. As an 
illustrative example, consider Advanced Micro Devices Inc. (AMD) and National Semiconductor 
Corporation (NSC) during 1977-99.4 Both firms operated mainly in the semiconductors subsector 
of the high tech information technology industry, a setting that has historically experienced great 
variation in the level of technological uncertainty, the cost of residual technological uncertainty, 
and the cost of alliances (e.g., Bresnahan and Greenstein 1999; Frankort 2013; Grove 1996; 
Kapoor 2013; Schilling 2015; Sytch et al. 2011), and so we might expect a priori that the 
learning horizon may have an effect consistent with proposition 4. 
AMD and NSC were similar on a number of dimensions. For example, both had their 
home in Silicon Valley and were among few semiconductors companies having remained 
independent by the end of the 1970s (Chandler 2005). Moreover, average annual R&D 
investments were similar between the two firms, at around $235MM, while both divided their 
alliance activities across IT subsectors in comparable ways, with around 80% of the alliances in 
microelectronics. They also had similar shares of contractual alliances compared to joint ventures. 
Finally, the extent to which partners had alliances among themselves—i.e., the density of the two 
alliance portfolios—was comparable as well. Despite all such similarities, however, AMD on 
average outperformed NSC by about 80% on patent-based measures of technological learning, 
which raises the question: what might explain such a differential? Our theory related to 
proposition 4 would predict that part of the difference in technological learning may have been 
due to the comparatively greater benefit AMD derived from the stability in its number of direct 
                                                          
    4 We developed this brief comparative case example based on combined data drawn from the Cooperative 
Agreements and Technology Indicators database (alliance data, 1977-99), the NBER patent data file (data on 
technological learning in IT, 1977-99), as well as searches of historical annual reports in Mergent Online and 
Mergent Archives (additional data, 1978-99). Details are available upon request. 
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partners, afforded by a more extensive distant learning horizon. Indeed, though the alliance 
portfolios of both firms were equally stable in terms of inter-temporal variance in numbers of 
direct partners, the extent of the learning horizon of AMD, in terms of numbers of indirect 
partners per direct partner, was on average more than 1.2 times that of NSC. 
6.2 Incomplete Awareness 
In his classic treatment of interorganizational relationship formation, Van de Ven (1976, p. 
31, italics added) noted that “organizations must be aware of possible sources…where their 
needed resources can be obtained; otherwise organizational directors are likely to conclude that 
the goal or need which motivates the search for resources cannot be attained.” To this point, we 
have treated firms’ awareness of indirect partners strictly dichotomously: firms are either 
unaware (i.e., a close learning horizon) or fully aware of all their non-redundant, unique indirect 
partners (i.e., 1 ). However, there can be a discrepancy between a firm’s total number of 
unique indirect partners (i.e., )1(   ) and those that the firm knows to exist.5 In this Section, 
we focus on a further generalization of our model to account for incomplete awareness. 
To incorporate incomplete awareness into our theory, it suffices to let 1'  be the 
average number of non-redundant indirect partners that a focal firm is aware of. It is 
straightforward to see that the necessary conditions for propositions 1 and 2 are replicated if 
1' . Hence, regardless of a firm’s actual number of unique indirect partners, as soon as it is 
aware of at least one such partner (i.e., 1' ), propositions 1 and 2 will hold. Turning to 
proposition 4, if '  rather than   is the relevant parameter from the standpoint of a firm facing 
an alliance formation decision, the features of proposition 4 are replicated if a firm with a greater 
                                                          
    5 This possibility is fully consistent with the literature on competitor identification, suggesting that cognitive 
limitations may lead to discrepancies between firms’ industry environments and cognitive models of such 
environments (Porac et al. 1995), which can have consequences for firm decision making (Zajac and Bazerman 
1991). To date, the implications of such cognitive constraints have remained largely unaddressed in the alliance 
literature (Westphal 2008). 
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number of unique indirect partners is aware of more such partners than a firm with a smaller 
number of unique indirect partners, i.e., 0)',( corr . This assumption is reasonable because 
the alliance portfolio of a firm with a greater number of partners should be more visible than that 
of a firm with a smaller number of partners. 
Because 2  represents the inverse of a firm’s ability to learn from indirect partners, we 
can now be more precise in our distinction between close and distant learning horizons. If a firm 
is unaware of unique indirect partners (i.e., 1' ), then its ability to learn from them is 
irrelevant and so the firm has a close learning horizon. Instead, if the firm is aware of at least one 
unique indirect partner (i.e., 1' ) and it is able to learn from that partner (i.e., 2 ), then it 
has a distant learning horizon. Therefore, neither awareness nor ability alone is sufficient for a 
firm to act on the learning potential afforded by non-redundant indirect partners. In particular, all 
effects summarized in propositions 1, 2, and 4 will hold if both 1'  and 2 . 
Though our labeling of learning horizons as close or distant at first blush suggests that the 
learning horizon concept has a strictly binary interpretation, the extent of the learning potential 
associated with different learning horizons actually represents a continuum, with three boundary 
scenarios. First, firms without indirect partners, those that have indirect partners yet without 
awareness of them, or those that have indirect partners yet without the ability to learn from them 
have the most restricted learning horizon, which we labeled a close learning horizon. Second, 
firms that are aware of one unique indirect partner and are at least minimally able to learn from 
that partner have the most restrictive distant learning horizon. Third, firms with many indirect 
partners that they are both aware of and able to learn from have the most extensive distant 
learning horizon. 
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7. DISCUSSION 
To begin to consider the role of indirect partners in optimal alliance portfolio design (e.g., 
Lavie 2006: 651), we asked how learning from indirect partners influences a firm’s optimal 
number of direct partners in the face of technological uncertainty. Our formal Bayesian learning 
model of optimal alliance formation demonstrated, first, that a firm’s learning horizon has 
distinct normative implications for optimal alliance formation depending on the firm’s specific 
industry context. In a high tech industry, where technological uncertainty is comparatively high, 
residual uncertainty is costly, and where alliances are a comparatively affordable and effective 
solution to technological uncertainty, firms with a distant learning horizon can substitute alliance 
ties to indirect partners for those with direct partners. In contrast, in a low tech industry, where 
technological uncertainty is comparatively low, residual uncertainty is less costly, and where 
alliances are a comparatively costly and ineffective solution to technological uncertainty, alliance 
ties to direct and indirect partners act as complements. These basic implications of our model 
resonate with recent literature analyzing complementarities across firms’ learning activities (e.g., 
Cassiman and Veugelers 2006), by suggesting that the question of whether alliance ties to direct 
and indirect partners are complements or substitutes must be answered with reference to relevant 
contextual variables (Ahuja 2000, pp. 450-451). 
Second, our model implies that in a high tech environment and relative to a firm with a 
more restricted learning horizon, a firm with a more extensive learning horizon benefits more 
from a given level of inter-temporal stability in its number of direct alliance partners. In 
particular, given a distant learning horizon, the optimal number of direct partners of a firm in a 
high tech industry will be more robust to inter-temporal changes in the cost of residual 
technological uncertainty, the cost of alliances, and the perceived level of technological 
uncertainty. Therefore, in high tech industries, the inter-temporal stability of some firms’ alliance 
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activities may be understood as the strategically optimal outcome (in the Bayesian sense) of firms’ 
efforts to reduce technological uncertainty. Our novel strategic explanation for inter-temporal 
stability in firms’ alliance activities complements prior research that has often discussed such 
stability in terms of embeddedness and inertia mechanisms (e.g., Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; 
Hagedoorn 2006; Kim et al. 2006). 
Our treatment of the learning horizon concept captures in an integrative way various 
factors of importance when considering the role of indirect partners in optimal alliance portfolio 
design. At a basic level, it allows firms to vary in their number of indirect partners for a given 
number of direct partners. Though existing research has already begun to account for such a 
possibility (Ahuja 2000; Vanhaverbeke et al. 2012), it has nevertheless implicitly assumed that 
firms’ learning from indirect partners is purely a function of the number of such partners. More 
broadly, it has tended to assume that knowledge flows fairly easily beyond individual alliance 
dyads, for example, between indirectly connected firms (Ghosh and Rosenkopf 2014). However, 
a firm with five indirect partners may be aware of all five yet have a limited ability to learn from 
them, while an otherwise identical firm may be aware of only two indirect partners yet have a 
strong ability to learn from these two. To account for such heterogeneity, our model formally 
incorporates as relevant parameters the extent to which firms are aware of and able to learn from 
their indirect partners. This way, our theory facilitates a refocusing, away from the assumption 
that firms’ learning from indirect partners is a direct function of the actual number of such 
partners, towards a more nuanced account that considers both firms’ cognitive limitations in 
observing other firms (Westphal 2008) as well as limitations in learning from them (Burt 2010; 
Ghosh and Rosenkopf 2014). 
Further opportunities exist to extend our research as well as address some of its 
limitations. First, in part because our approach has been theoretical, it will be important to subject 
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the predictions of our theoretical model to empirical testing. For example, though a few prior 
studies appear generally consistent with propositions 1 and 2, research in low tech industries is 
limited as is the systematic study of factors such as the awareness of and ability to learn from 
indirect partners. Moreover, while the consistency of our brief comparative case of AMD versus 
NSC with proposition 4 is promising (Section 6.1), empirical refutation through a large-scale 
empirical design would be necessary. Such empirical tests might answer a number of related 
questions: Do measures of firms’ learning horizon predict alliance formation and firm learning? 
Can they predict the inter-temporal stability of firms’ alliance portfolio size? If so, then how will 
such effects vary across industries with different levels of technological uncertainty? Reliance on 
secondary data may not suffice to address such questions because learning horizons can vary in 
their extent with the awareness of and ability to learn from indirect partners. Thus, surveys may 
be used to gauge firms’ view of the partner landscape (e.g., Lhuillery and Pfister 2011). 
Second, our model is based on the assumption that within a technological paradigm, it is 
eventually possible to discern one optimal technological trajectory. This assumption is reasonable 
in light of multiple and diverse corroborative industry cases (e.g., Anderson and Tushman 1990; 
Cusumano et al. 1992; Suarez and Utterback 1995). Nonetheless, it is of course possible that, at 
least in the intermediate term, multiple trajectories cannot easily be distinguished based on 
projections regarding their feasibility, marketability, and profitability. Future research might 
account for the possibility of multiple concurrent optimal trajectories in the intermediate term, 
which mathematically amounts to defining T to be a vector of values (e.g., Raiffa and Schlaifer 
1961; Zellner 1971). We speculate that our results will remain similar in spirit under the 
assumption that the elements of the vector of optima are somehow positively correlated, such that 
observations obtained through alliances at once allow firms to update their beliefs about all 
conceivable optima. In practice, this is plausible either if the technologies underlying multiple 
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optimal trajectories are comparable on at least a subset of all relevant technological dimensions 
or if they are complementary in defining a common application domain (e.g., Kodama 1991). 
In conclusion, our study extends the alliance literature by offering a formal and 
integrative account of the role of indirect partners in optimal alliance portfolio design, generating 
several normative propositions amenable to future empirical refutation. We hope our theory 
offers an impetus for further exploration of the effects of firms’ learning horizon on the formation 
and consequences of alliances by firms faced with technological uncertainty. 
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APPENDIX: DERIVATION OF THE POSTERIOR VARIANCE (EQUATION (3)) 
Suppose the covariance matrix for the observations x1, x2, ... , xη is given by 

x . Each variable xi 
is normally distributed with mean T and variance 
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where ɩ is an   by 1 vector whose elements contain the number 1 and x is an   by 1 vector 
containing the observations xi. To determine the posterior variance of T it suffices to collect all 
terms that involve T 2, i.e.,   2
2
1 1
T
T
x
T


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





  . Because we assume that observations are 
independently and identically distributed,   .111 2
2
1
2
2
2
1
TT
Ti xT
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T
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
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  Therefore, the 
posterior variance of T is equal to 
1
22
2 1

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
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
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Tx 

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